A little-noticed federal case against a Pentagon contractors employee has exposed just how deeply modern office printers can monitor, record, and archive what workers put on paper.
Federal prosecutors have charged Aurelio Luis Perez-Lugones, an IT specialist employed by an unnamed government contractor, with unlawful retention of national defense information, according to an FBI affidavit filed on January 9.
As reported by Breitbart, the case first drew public attention when federal agents searched the home of a Washington Post journalist, but subsequent disclosures have highlighted a far more sweeping concern: the quiet evolution of office printers into powerful surveillance tools that can store complete copies of every document they process.
The investigation became public when the Washington Post revealed that federal agents had seized equipment belonging to reporter Hannah Natanson, including her work laptop, personal laptop, phone, and smartwatch.
According to Breitbart News, Florida Attorney General Ashley Moodys chief of staff, Alexei Woltornist Bondi, underscored the Trump administrations hard line on leaks, writing, This past week, at the request of the Department of War, the Department of Justice and FBI executed a search warrant at the home of a Washington Post journalist who was obtaining and reporting classified and illegally leaked information from a Pentagon contractor. The leaker is currently behind bars. I am proud to work alongside Secretary Hegseth on this effort. The Trump Administration will not tolerate illegal leaks of classified information that, when reported, pose a grave risk to our Nations national security and the brave men and women who are serving our country.
The FBI affidavit lays out in granular detail how Perez-Lugones allegedly attempted to smuggle classified material out of a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). It also describes the unexpected way his employer uncovered the scheme: not through human whistleblowers or random audits, but through the hidden capabilities of a networked office printer.
According to federal investigators, Perez-Lugones printed a classified intelligence report in a manner that appeared designed to evade routine scrutiny. Rather than simply printing the original file, he allegedly took screenshots of the classified material, cropped those images, and pasted them into a Microsoft Word document, according to the affidavit.
The document was then given a bland, generic title, Microsoft Word Document1, a label unlikely to raise red flags during standard reviews of printer logs. On a typical corporate network, such logs might only record the file name, user, time, and size of the print job, leaving the content itself opaque to casual inspection.
However, the affidavit reveals that Perez-Lugoness employer had gone far beyond basic metadata tracking. Investigators say the contractors systems allowed administrators to reconstruct the full contents of printed documents, including the screenshots Perez-Lugones allegedly embedded. As the affidavit bluntly states, Perez-Lugones employer can retrieve records of print activity on classified systems, including copies of printed documents.
This capability stems from specialized printer monitoring software that silently intercepts print jobs on the network. When a user sends a document to print, the system automatically creates a duplicate copy and generates images of every page, all without notifying the employee that such a record is being created.
Administrators can then decide how long to retain these shadow copies and how much storage to devote to them, effectively building an archive of everything that passes through the printer. In a secure government environment, such tools may be justified as a safeguard against espionage and leaks, but in ordinary workplaces they raise serious questions about privacy, transparency, and the scope of employer surveillance.
Beyond the printing episode, investigators also allege that Perez-Lugones was seen opening a classified document and taking handwritten notes. The affidavit recounts that he appeared to look back and forth between the screen corresponding the classified system and the notepad, all the while writing on the notepad, a level of detail that strongly suggests video monitoring of the workspace, even though the filing does not explicitly confirm the use of cameras.
For conservatives who have long argued that national security leaks must be treated as serious crimes, the Perez-Lugones case will be viewed as a vindication of robust counterintelligence measures and the Trump administrations tougher stance on unauthorized disclosures.
At the same time, the revelation that office printers can quietly store complete replicas of every printed page serves as a stark reminder that, in the modern workplace, employees operate under an expanding web of digital surveillanceone that may be justified in high-security government facilities, but that demands far more scrutiny and accountability when extended into the private sector.
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