The Supreme Courts struggle over whether men who identify as women may compete in female sports exposed not only a deep cultural divide but also a troubling display of confusion from Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson.
According to the Gateway Pundit, the Court on Tuesday heard oral arguments in challenges to laws from Idaho and West Virginia that bar biological males from competing in girls and womens sports, with opponents claiming these protections for female athletes violate the Constitutions Equal Protection Clause and Title IX.
At stake is whether states may continue to recognize biological reality in order to preserve womens sports, or whether gender ideology will be elevated above both science and common sense in federal constitutional law.
The cases were brought by two biological males, Lindsay Hecox in Idaho and Becky Pepper-Jackson in West Virginia, who insist that the state laws unlawfully discriminate on the basis of sex and so-called transgender status. They argue that these statutes categorically exclude every transgender female from school sports and treat them worse than other students.
Supporters of the laws counter that this narrative is false and that Idaho and West Virginia are simply enforcing basic scientific distinctions to ensure fair competition and protect the opportunities and safety of female athletes. From a conservative standpoint, these measures reflect a legitimate state interest in defending womens sports from being erased by policies that pretend biological differences do not exist.
During oral arguments, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson brushed aside the biological realities at issue and aligned herself with the demands of male athletes seeking entry into female categories. Her questioning, meandering and opaque, appeared to mirror the rhetorical style often associated with Vice President Kamala Harris, raising concerns about the level of rigor being applied to a case with profound implications for women and girls.
At one point, Jackson seemed to be groping toward a question about whether males who identify as transgender and have undergone medical interventions should be treated differently from other men under equal-protection analysis. Yet the way she framed the issue was so convoluted that Idahos attorney, Alan Michael Hurst, had to pause to decipher what she was even asking before she cut him off to clarify her point.
Jackson began, So, to the extent that you have an individual who says what is happening in this law is that it is treating someone who transgender, but does not have, because of the medical interventions and the things that have been done, who does not have, uh, the same, uh, threat to physical competition and safety and all the reasons the state puts forward thats actually a different class, says this individual. She continued, And uh, so youre not treating the class the same. And how do you respond to that?
She then tried to reframe the issue in doctrinal terms, saying, In other words, the as-applied challenge essentially redefines the classSo what is wrong with that number one and how do you square that with our uh, holdings, in CabanIn other words, Layer suggests that as-applied challenges of this nature do exist. The reference appeared to conflate or misstate prior precedent, further muddying the waters in an already complex equal-protection debate.
Hurst responded carefully, signaling that Jacksons premise did not match the actual holdings of the cases she invoked. Well, certainly Let me take a second for the question. Caban says nothing of as applied, he explained, before adding, (Caban) says
Jackson cut in again, insisting on her reading of the precedents: I understand, but those two cases were in juxtaposition with one another, and Layer comes out the way it does, disguising Caban on the basis that it is an as-applied challenge and we have a facial challenge, and its basically the same facts. So, if youre right, these two cases cant come out the way that they do.
Her insistence underscored the disconnect between her theoretical framing and the actual structure of the litigation before the Court.
Hurst pushed back, emphasizing that the earlier case was about standing, not some sweeping as-applied doctrine that would undermine Idahos position. I dont think so, your Honor. Layer was briefed as a standing argument of maybe you might be able to argue that this law is overbroad, but you individually are not in the overbroad part. And therefore, you dont get to challenge it, he said, adding, The Court didnt use language, like expressed stated language in the opinion, but that is the logic of the opinion.
At that point, Justice Neil Gorsuch stepped in, seemingly to redirect the discussion and restore some clarity to the argument. GORSUCH: Mr. Hurst, theres another way to think about the case. Your friends on the other side pause it, he began, signaling a return to a more grounded legal analysis after Jacksons tangled line of questioning.
The exchange highlighted a broader tension: whether the Court will uphold the authority of states to protect womens sports based on biological sex, or whether it will endorse an ever-expanding theory of transgender rights untethered from physical reality. For parents, athletes, and policymakers who believe in limited government, objective science, and the hard-won gains of womens athletics, the outcome of this case will signal whether the Court still has the courage to defend those principles against ideological pressure.
Login