As the California Army National Guard grapples with unruly protests incited by lawful immigration enforcement, a more pressing and perilous issue looms over the California Air National Guard.
This imminent threat necessitates the immediate attention of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.
The events of January 12, 1981, serve as a stark reminder of the potential dangers. On this day, Puerto Rican independence militants infiltrated the Muoz Marin International Airport in Carolina, slicing through the fence and annihilating nearly $50 million worth of A-7 Corsair and F-104 Starfighter jets. In today's terms, this equates to a staggering $162 million loss.
While security forces are equipped to thwart ground-based attacks, they stand helpless against drone assaults. Fast forward four decades to Los Angeles, where so-called "spontaneous" mass protests are marked by professionally made signs in English and Spanish, brand new six-foot Mexican flags, and throngs of unidentified protesters. The question arises: who is funding these sudden demonstrations?
According to an explosive report by Jennifer Van Laar at Red State, it appears that a significant portion of the funding may be sourced from our own tax dollars. However, it would be unwise to dismiss the potential involvement of Mexican cartels, whose trafficking and smuggling operations have been significantly hampered by Trump's policies. If this is the case, what's to prevent them, or their proxies, from targeting the National Guard next?
The potential for a repeat of the 1981 Macheteros' sabotage, or something even more catastrophic, is a real concern. Take Moffett Field near Palo Alto, for instance. One side of its perimeter is directly adjacent to Highway 101, providing an open target for any disgruntled individual armed with a drone.
Air Guard security may be able to intercept human intruders given sufficient warning, but drones present a different challenge. They don't require stealthy ground infiltration. They can be launched from a public park and cover 200 yards in mere seconds. For a mere $500 and a payload of inexpensive explosives, a first-person-view drone could obliterate a $77 million HC-130J.
There is currently no active defense against drone attacks in densely populated urban areas, a fact well known to the U.S. Air Force. The 17-day drone overflight in 2023, which went unimpeded and unchallenged, was a stark reminder of this vulnerability.
Federal law limits counter-drone actions to designated "sensitive" areas. But what if a missile interception results in debris showering onto neighboring residential areas? What if an electromagnetic pulse disables every pacemaker, microwave, and computer within a mile radius?
The situation at the Air National Guard base in Fresno is equally concerning. F-15s are housed under open-sided shelters a mere 75 yards from the highway. While security forces are equipped to handle ground-based attacks, they are ill-prepared for drone assaults. The only existing defense is a handful of warning signs affixed to perimeter fences, a far cry from a robust security measure.
The solution isn't to ban drones or launch missiles over residential areas. Instead, it's crucial to devise strategies to disrupt their precision. Drones rely on pinpoint accuracy, or what the military refers to as "circular error probable." Today's FPV drones, guided by first-person cameras, can strike tank hatches with a CEP of just one foot.
However, there is a silver lining. Drones can be neutralized without being shot down. All that's required is to disrupt their accuracy. Drones are delicate. Their video cameras are sensitive to bright light. Their inertial sensors lose calibration under unpredictable aerodynamic stress. Their rotors must remain perfectly balanced, or their guidance systems falter and fail.
By targeting the CEP instead of the drone itself, the Air Guard can safeguard its assets without endangering civilian lives. Practical countermeasures are readily available, including iso-luminescent light sources, targeted atmospheric aerosols, forced inertial failures, and even decoys.
These are not billion-dollar Pentagon programs. They are cost-effective insurance policies against an increasingly probable airborne threat. If protest organizers or cartel affiliates can rent drones and purchase fireworks, what's preventing them from attaching small explosive charges? The answer is nothing, unless the Air Guard reevaluates its strategy.
The failure to prepare for the next wave of attacks is no longer an option. If the military doesn't take steps to defend its own runways, someone else will seize the opportunity.
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